Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Elaine Craig

2017

Judging Sexual Assault Trials: Systemic Failure in
the Case of Regina v Bassam Al-Rawi
Elaine Craig

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/elaine_craig/13/

JUDGING SEXUAL ASSAULT TRIALS:
SYSTEMIC FAILURE IN THE CASE OF
REGINA V BASSAM AL-RAWI
Elaine Craig*
The recent decision to acquit a Halifax taxi driver of sexual assault in a case
involving a very intoxicated woman, who was found by police in the accused’s
vehicle unconscious and naked from the breasts down, rightly sparked public
criticism and consternation. A review of the trial record in Al-Rawi, including
the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the closing submissions
of the Crown and defence counsel, and the trial judge’s oral decision suggests
a failure of our legal system to respond appropriately to allegations of sexual
assault—a failure for which, the author argues, both the trial judge and legal
counsel may bear some responsibility.
La récente décision d’acquitter un chauffeur de taxi de Halifax accusé
d’agression sexuelle, dans une affaire impliquant une femme en état d’ébriété
avancé que la police a retrouvée inconsciente et nue depuis la poitrine dans la
voiture de l’accusé, a fait l’objet, à juste titre, de critiques et de consternation
auprès du public. L’examen du dossier d’instruction de l’affaire Al-Rawi,
notamment l’interrogatoire et le contre-interrogatoire des témoins, l’exposé
final du procureur de la Couronne et celui de l’avocat de la défense, ainsi que
la décision rendue oralement par le juge du procès, fait ressortir l’échec de notre
système judiciaire quant à la façon appropriée de répondre aux accusations
d’agression sexuelle—échec pour lequel le juge et les avocats en question
seraient, selon l’auteure, en partie responsables.
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1. A Failure of Our Legal System
A review of the trial record in R v Al-Rawi—including the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses, the closing submissions of the Crown and
defence counsel, and Judge Greg Lenehan’s oral decision—suggests a failure
of our legal system to respond appropriately to this allegation of sexual
assault—a failure for which all three of the legal professionals accountable
for the legal proceeding in this case may bear some responsibility.
The Complainant in Al-Rawi was a 28-year-old woman. She had spent
the evening socializing and drinking with friends in a Halifax bar, and was
highly intoxicated at the time of the incident. She entered the accused’s taxi
at 1:09 am and was found by the police 11 minutes later, in the backseat
of the accused’s vehicle, unconscious and naked from the breasts down.
Her legs were propped up on the bucket seats in front of her, in a straddle
position, with one foot on each seat. The accused was in between her legs,
facing her, with his pants undone and partially lowered.1

1
R v Al-Rawi, Audio Trial Transcript (9–10 February 2017) Halifax 2866665
(NSPC) [Audio Trial Transcript (9–10 February 2017)]. The officer who found her testified
that Al-Rawi was between her legs and that he was facing towards the back of the vehicle—
which would mean he was facing her (infra note 81).
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In addition to police testimony describing the circumstances and
condition in which the Complainant was found, Judge Lenehan heard the
following evidence:
•

They were parked on a poorly lit street at 1:20 am when the police
found them.

•

Rather than taking her in the direction of her home, the accused
had driven her to a different, and inexplicable, part of the city.

•

The Complainant remained unconscious as Al-Rawi was ordered
to exit the vehicle; when she did re-gain consciousness, after being
shaken by the officer, she was confused and upset.

•

Her DNA was found around the accused’s mouth.

•

Beyond her lack of consciousness, the Complainant showed
other signs associated with severe intoxication, including bladder
incontinence.

•

Her blood alcohol level was high: between 223 and 244 milligrams
per cent. She had been denied re-entry to the bar due to her level
of intoxication.

•

She had no memory of entering, nor of what occurred in, the taxi.

•

The accused was holding her urine-soaked pants and underwear,
which he attempted to hide when he became aware of the police
officer’s presence.2

None of this evidence was challenged in any significant way by the defence,
yet Al-Rawi was acquitted. Judge Lenehan found that Al-Rawi had removed
the Complainant’s pants and underwear. However, he concluded that there
was no evidence that this was non-consensual. He also determined that
there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the Complainant lacked
the capacity to consent as a result of her intoxication.3 Responding to Judge
Lenehan’s decision, legal scholar Elizabeth Sheehy commented that a failure
to convict on an evidentiary record of this nature sends the message that “it
is open season on incapacitated women.”4
2

Audio Trial Transcript: 9–10 February 2017, supra note 1.
R v Al-Rawi, Audio Trial Transcript: Oral Decision (1 March 2017) Halifax
2866665 (NSPC) at 13h:36m:43s to 13h:57m:23s [Oral Decision].
4
Ashifa Kassam, “Canada sex assault acquittal signals ‘open season on incapacitated
women’” The Guardian (7 March 2017), online: <www.theguardian.com>.
3
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How did this trial result in such a perverse outcome? To begin with,
Judge Lenehan made several legal errors, including the following: (1) he
failed to apply the proper legal standard for capacity to consent; (2) he
confused the actus reus and mens rea elements for the offence of sexual
assault; (3) he failed to uphold section 276 of the Criminal Code;5 and (4) he
failed in his legal approach to the evidence as a whole.
Arguably, both the Crown and defence counsel also contributed to the
problematic outcome in Al-Rawi. For example, defence counsel introduced
evidence that the Complainant had flirted and danced inappropriately
earlier in the evening on the night of the incident. The theory of the defence
appears to have been that the Complainant, when she consumes alcohol,
becomes the “type of person”6 who flirts and dances inappropriately with
men in bars, and can reasonably be inferred to have entered a taxi, stripped
her urine-soiled clothes off, thrown them at the unknown driver, perhaps
kissed or licked his face, and then propped up her legs in the straddle
position minutes or seconds before passing out. The Crown did not object
when defence counsel introduced this evidence, which arguably should
have been excluded under Canada’s rape shield regime; nor did the Crown,
in his closing, urge the trial judge to ensure that it not be relied upon to draw
stereotypical inferences about women, alcohol, and sex.
The adversarial model upon which our criminal trial process is premised
involves different legal actors performing particular, and interdependent,
roles. Systemic failure occurs when the errors of the individual components
of the system alone do not fully explain the miscarriage. An examination
of the trial proceedings and the disturbing outcome in Al-Rawi suggests a
failure of this type.
The remainder of this article proceeds in three parts. Part II examines
some of the legal errors made by Judge Lenehan with respect to two of the
central issues in this case: lack of capacity to consent and lack of actual
consent. Part III considers the ways in which the Crown and defence counsel
may have contributed to the judicial errors in this case by invoking (or in
the Crown’s case failing to challenge) the stereotype of the “unchaste party
girl”: willing and ready to consent to sex anywhere, with anyone, in any
circumstances. The concluding section suggests that this case demonstrates
5

RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code].
R v Al-Rawi, Audio Trial Transcript: Testimony of the Complainant (9 February
2017) Halifax 2866665 (NSPC) at 15h:24m:42s [Testimony of Complainant]. In his crossexamination, defence counsel asked the Complainant whether, when intoxicated, she forgets
where she is going or what she is doing. She responded that she does not know because
she cannot always remember what happens when she is drunk. He then suggested that was
because “you don’t necessarily remember the type of person you become when you’re …
[Complainant]: Yeah I just … I can only speculate”.
6
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why better sexual assault training for judges is required, and why trial judges
should be required to provide written decisions in all sexual assault cases.
2. Capacity to Consent, Evidence of Non-Consent &
Speculation Based on Stereotype
Judge Lenehan’s decision is filled with legal errors. Three of those errors
include: (i) a failure to apply the correct legal test for lack of capacity to
consent; (ii) a failure to consider the significant circumstantial evidence
of non-consent adduced by the Crown; and (iii) speculation about
the Complainant’s behavior that appears to be based on stereotypical
assumptions about women and sex.
A) The Legal Test for Lack of Capacity to Consent
One of the central issues in this case was whether the Complainant, due
to her level of intoxication, lacked the capacity to consent to Al-Rawi
removing her pants and underwear.7 The Complainant was unconscious
when the police found her. She had lost control of her bladder and had no
7

The focus in this section of the article is on Judge Lenehan’s failure to apply the
correct legal test for lack of capacity. His failure to conclude that the Complainant lacked
capacity to consent was also wrong. Judge Lenehan stated that the toxicologist’s evidence
provided the possibility that with her blood alcohol level the Complainant “might very well
have been capable of appearing lucid but drunk and able to direct, ask, agree or consent”
(Oral Decision, supra note 3 at 13h:55m:47s.). The toxicologist did testify that an individual
under the influence of alcohol has the ability to make decisions, but that alcohol can impair
their mental functions to such an extent that “incorrect or bad decisions” are made. However,
it is not clear whether, at this point in her evidence, she was referring to individuals with
intoxication or severe intoxication. The Complainant’s blood alcohol level was in the range
normally associated with intoxication for an average drinker. However, the toxicologist also
testified that the Complainant showed some signs of severe intoxication. She testified that
loss of bladder control and loss of consciousness are associated with someone who is severely
intoxicated and would be signs that the Complainant in this case was severely intoxicated.
The toxicologist stated that someone who is severely intoxicated would have an inability
to walk or stand, decreased sensation to pain, and loss of continence and consciousness.
She testified that with severe intoxication: “we are expecting there to be a really great
deterioration in the mental and sensory processes.” She opined that such a person would
have “severe mental deficiencies, adverse effect with respect to attention, comprehension,
judgment, information processing.” In response to a question by the trial judge, she testified
that some of the Complainant’s symptoms (like incontinence and unconsciousness) were
consistent with severe intoxication, others (like blackouts) could suggest varying degrees of
intoxication. Judge Lenehan’s decision did not reference any of this evidence. In addition,
he misstated the Complainant’s evidence on the amount of alcohol she had consumed. She
testified to having consumed five pints of beer before she attended the bar, where she drank
two shots of tequila and a mixed drink. Judge Lenehan stated that the Complainant recalled
drinking the two shots of tequila and the mixed drink. He made no reference to the five pints
of beer she had also consumed. See e.g. R v Al-Rawi, Audio Trial Transcript: Testimony of
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memory of what occurred after she entered the taxi. She testified that she
had consumed five pints of beer, two shots of tequila, and at least one mixed
drink that night, that she had not eaten dinner beforehand, and that she was
not a regular drinker at the time of the incident.8 Her best friend described
her as getting drunker as the night progressed, and testified that at some
point during the evening the alcohol “hit her fast … kinda all at once.”9 The
toxicologist testified that some of her symptoms (like incontinence and
unconsciousness) were consistent with severe intoxication, while others
(like blackouts) could suggest varying degrees of intoxication.10
Numerous courts have grappled with identifying the point at which a
complainant’s level of intoxication means she is incapable of consenting.11
Judge Lenehan’s assertion that “clearly a drunk can consent” was insensitive
and carelessly worded, but it was legally correct.12 Up to a certain point of
intoxication, an individual is considered legally capable of consenting to
sexual contact. The Criminal Code stipulates that no consent is obtained if
the complainant is “incapable of consenting to the activity.”13 The issue is
determining at what level of intoxication a complainant becomes incapable
of consenting. According to the Supreme Court of Canada, individuals must
have “the mental capacity to give meaningful consent.”14 This requires the
ability to understand the “sexual nature of the act” and the capacity to realize
“that he or she may choose to decline participation.”15 Lower courts have
also considered the issue. In R v Innes for example, Justice Lack provided the
following definition of capacity to consent to sexual touching:
There is no requirement that a complainant be a virtual robot before she will be
found to be incapable of consenting to sexual activity. Consent requires a reasonably
informed choice, freely exercised, without interference with the freedom of a

Tracy Cherlet (10 February 2017) Halifax 2866665 (NSPC) at 11h:12m:28s to 11h:47m:18s
[Testimony of Tracy Cherlet].
8
Testimony of Complainant, supra note 6 at 14h:10m:20s to 14h:15m:00s.
9
R v Al-Rawi, Audio Trial Transcript: Testimony of L.I. (9 February 2017) Halifax
2866665 (NSPC) at 15h:47m:34s [Testimony of LI].
10
Testimony of Tracy Cherlet, supra note 6.
11
See e.g. R v Daigle [1998] 1 SCR 1220 at paras 2–3, 127 CCC (3d) 129 [Daigle]; R v
Innes, 2004 CanLII 33306 at paras 20–21, [2004] OJ No 4150 (QL) (SC) [Innes]; R v Siddiqui,
2004 BCSC 1717 at para 55, [2004] BCJ No 2690 [Siddiqui]; R v AA (2001), 155 CCC (3d)
279, 2001 CanLII 3091 (ONCA) at paras 7–11 [AA]; R v Polo Cedeno, 2005 ONCJ 91 at 7–9,
195 CCC (3d) 468 [Polo Cedeno]; R v Cornejo, (2003), 68 OR (3d) 117 at paras 15–16, 181
CCC (3d) 206 (CA).
12
Unfortunately because he was careless in the way he worded it—“Clearly a drunk
can consent”—this aspect of his decision drew particular public criticism and outrage (Oral
Decision, supra note 3).
13
Supra note 5, s 273.1(2)(b).
14
R v JA, 2011 SCC 28 at para 36, [2011] 2 SCR 440 [JA].
15
R v Daigle, 127 CCC (3d) 130, [1997] JQ no 2668 (QL) (CA) at paras 23–24.
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person’s will. Free will can be constrained in many ways, one of which may be by the
influence of alcohol.16

Other courts have described the standard as: the capacity to understand
the risks and consequences associated with the activity;17 the ability to
understand and agree;18 and “something more than the capacity to execute
baseline physical functions.”19
Judge Lenehan’s initial statement of the law concerning capacity to
consent was consistent with what other courts have articulated. He stated:
“a person would be incapable of giving consent if she is unconscious or is
so intoxicated by alcohol or drugs as to be incapable of understanding or
perceiving the situation that presents itself.”20 Despite this initially correct
description of the law, other parts of his decision suggest that he applied the
wrong legal test for capacity to consent.
Judge Lenehan determined that there was no question the Complainant
was drunk and unconscious when Constable Thibault found her in AlRawi’s vehicle. Based on these findings he concluded that: “therefore at that
moment, when Constable Thibault approached Mr. Al-Rawi’s vehicle, [the
Complainant] was in fact incapable of consenting to any sexual activity. That
also means that whenever she did pass out, she would have been incapable.”21
These statements are true and reflect an application of the correct legal
standard for capacity to consent. An unconscious person lacks capacity to
consent.22 However, what Judge Lenehan said next suggests he may have
relied upon an erroneous understanding of the law. He stated: “What is
unknown, however, is the moment [the Complainant] lost consciousness.
That is important. Because it would appear that prior to that she had been
able to communicate with others … she had appeared to make decisions for
herself, however unwise those decisions might have been.”23
Whether the Complainant was conscious, or could speak, or whether
she appeared to make decisions for herself, such as to enter a taxi or stay out
partying, is not the legal standard for capacity to consent to sexual touching.
The test is whether, when her clothing was removed and her legs were spread
apart and propped up on the seats in front of her, she was sufficiently aware
16

Innes, supra note 11 at para 24 [footnotes omitted].
Siddiqui, supra note 11 at para 55; AA, supra note 11 at para 9.
18
R v P, 2004 NSCA 27 at para 15, 221 NSR (2d) 370. See generally Janine Benedet,
“The Sexual Assault of Intoxicated Women” (2010) 22:2 CJWL 435 at 442.
19
R v Haraldson, 2012 ABCA 147 at para 7, 524 AR 315.
20
Oral Decision, supra note 3 at 13h:47m:59s.
21
Ibid at 13h:49m:03s.
22
JA, supra note 14 at para 48.
23
Oral Decision, supra note 3 at 13h:49m:29s.
17
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of her surroundings, able to appreciate the risks and consequences of having
sexual contact with Al-Rawi, and capable of making a choice to do so.24
Despite having articulated a version of this legal test earlier in his decision,
it is not clear that Judge Lenehan applied it. For example, he does not appear
to have considered whether, at her level of intoxication, the Complainant
would have been capable of assessing the risks of unprotected sex, or public
sex, with an unknown man.
Judge Lenehan also erred by supporting his assertion that the Crown
had provided no evidence on the issue of lack of consent with the conclusion
that the Complainant might have appeared capable of consent:
[A]t the critical time when Mr. Al-Rawi would have stripped [the Complainant] of
her clothes, the Crown has provided absolutely no evidence on the issue of lack of
consent. The evidence of the [toxicologist] provided the possibility that with a blood
alcohol level of 223 to 244 milligrams per cent, [the Complainant] might very well
have been capable of appearing lucid, but drunk and able to direct, ask, agree or
consent to any number of different activities.25

The issue of non-consent is not determined based on how the Complainant
appeared; it is based on her subjective state of mind at the time the sexual
touching occurred.26 The issue of capacity—what a complainant was capable
of—is determined based on her actual level of awareness and ability to
make an informed decision to consent to sex, not on whether she appeared
capable of doing so. Judge Lenehan seems to have conflated the actus reus
and the mens rea elements of the offence of sexual assault in this part of his
judgment. Whether she was capable of appearing lucid and able to direct AlRawi to remove her clothes is relevant to the mens rea element of the offence,
not the actus reus (which is what he was addressing in this paragraph).
B) Evidence of Non-Consent
Although he found that the accused had removed the Complainant’s pants
and underwear, Judge Lenehan determined that the Crown had offered no
evidence that the Complainant did not consent to being stripped by AlRawi. Indeed, Judge Lenehan asserted throughout his decision that “the
Crown provided absolutely no evidence on the issue of lack of consent.”27
Given the evidentiary record in this case, his assertion that there was no
24

Daigle, supra note 15 at paras 23–24.
Oral Decision, supra note 3 at 13h:55m:28s [emphasis added].
26
R v Ewanchuk [1999] 1 SCR 330 at para 26, 131 CCC (3d) 481 [Ewanchuk]; JA,
supra note 14 at para 48.
27
Oral Decision, supra note 3 at 13h:55m:28s. He later stated: “The Crown marshalled
no evidence of this. The Crown had no evidence to present on the issue of consent prior to
Constable Thibault arriving on scene” (ibid at 13h:53m:18s) and “the Crown failed to produce
25
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evidence on the issue of consent is difficult to understand and must have
flowed from one of the following two errors: (1) a failure to consider the
significant circumstantial evidence of non-consent adduced by the Crown;
or (2) an erroneous assumption that only direct evidence of non-consent is
probative of the issue.
Trial judges are required to consider all of the evidence in relation to
the ultimate issue28—in this case, lack of consent to the removal of the
complainant’s clothing. As the Supreme Court of Canada explained in R
v JMH, if the reasons demonstrate that this was not done the trial judge
has committed a legal error.29 In R v McKay, for example, the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal overturned an acquittal on the basis that: “[a]lthough a trial
judge is not “required to refer to every item of evidence considered or to
detail the way each item of evidence was assessed … the trial judge’s reasons,
in the case at hand, demonstrate that a comprehensive consideration of the
evidence was not completed.”30
Judge Lenehan’s repeated assertions that the Crown adduced no
evidence on the issue of lack of consent indicates that he did not perform
this requirement. It is not simply that he failed to reference or record in his
decision the Crown’s evidence of non-consent—which would not constitute
a legal error.31 It is not even just that he failed to consider the evidence
cumulatively—which would be a legal error.32 It is that he repeatedly stated
that such evidence did not exist. As delineated in the paragraphs to follow,
there was, in fact, significant circumstantial evidence of non-consent
introduced at trial. To begin with, consider the Crown’s evidence of the
Complainant’s intoxication.
i) Memory loss
First, there was clear evidence of the Complainant’s alcohol-induced loss of
memory. While Judge Lenehan was correct to state that “a lack of memory
does not equate to a lack of consent,”33 he was wrong not to identify the
Complainant’s blackout as circumstantial evidence of both actual nonany evidence of lack of consent at any time when Mr. Al-Rawi was touching [the
Complainant]” (ibid at 13h:51m:51s).
28
R v JMH, 2011 SCC 45 at para 31, [2011] 3 SCR 197 [JMH]. Ignoring items of
evidence that the law requires a trial judge to consider is an error of law, see Canada (Director
of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc., [1997] 1 SCR 748 at para 42, 144 DLR (4th) 1.
29
Ibid.
30
2017 SKCA 4 at para 22, 2017 SJ No 18 (QL) [McKay] [citations omitted].
31
JMH, supra note 28 at para 32.
32
JMH, supra note 28 at para 31; McKay, supra note 30 at para 24.
33
Oral Decision, supra note 3 at 13h:55m:56s.
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consent and lack of capacity to consent.34 As Justice Greene noted in a recent
case involving the sexual assault of a severely intoxicated woman in Ontario:
“a complainant’s alcohol induced lack of memory of an alleged sexual assault
may be circumstantial evidence relevant to the issue of actual consent and/
or capacity to consent.”35 Similarly, in R v JR, Justice Ducharme determined
that “evidence of memory loss or a blackout … may well be circumstantial
evidence which, when considered with other evidence in a case, may permit
inferences to be drawn about whether or not a complainant did or did not
consent[.]”36
ii) Bladder incontinence and unconsciousness
In addition to memory loss, the Crown in Al-Rawi adduced evidence that
the Complainant was so intoxicated that she lost control of her bladder and
urinated in her pants and underwear. Judge Lenehan found that Al-Rawi
removed the Complainant’s urine-soaked pants and underwear, which
means he must have accepted that she urinated in her clothing before the
sexual touching occurred. He also found that she was unconscious when the
police arrived, and that Al-Rawi picked the Complainant up in downtown
Halifax approximately 11 minutes before they were found by the police in
the south-end of the city. At that time of night, it would have taken Al-Rawi
approximately 5 minutes to drive from the pickup location to where the police
found them. Thus, Judge Lenehan had before him unchallenged evidence
capable of supporting the inference that Al-Rawi stripped the Complainant
of her clothes, at the very most, not more than roughly 6 minutes before it is
certain that the Complainant was unconscious. In other words, at the time
the sexual touching occurred the Complainant had urinated in her clothing
and was, assuming she was still conscious, within seconds or minutes of
passing out.
A finding that the Complainant lost control of her bladder and urinated
on herself, combined with evidence establishing that at most, giving him the
benefit of the doubt, Al-Rawi removed the Complainant’s clothing within
about 6 minutes of when she became unconscious, constitutes powerful
circumstantial evidence that she did not consent to sex with him. As a
matter of common sense, it is reasonable to infer that someone, who because
of alcohol consumption, is within minutes of passing out is not feeling
well. Moreover, given widely accepted social conceptions of desirability
and attraction, and the relationship between these concepts and norms
34
In her article Benedet, supra note 18, notes several cases in which the courts have
determined that evidence that a complainant’s level of intoxication was so high that she has
no memory of the events is circumstantial evidence of lack of capacity. See e.g. Polo Cedeno,
supra note 11; R v Chahal, 2002 BCPC 98, [2002] BCJ No 631 (QL).
35
R v Tariq, 2016 ONCJ 614 at para 68, 343 CCC (3d) 87 [Tariq].
36
R v JR, 40 CR (6th) 97, [2006] OJ No 2698 (QL) (SCJ) at para 20.
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regarding personal hygiene, it is reasonable to infer that a young woman
who has urinated in her clothing would not be interested in having sex
with anyone, let alone a complete stranger. All of which is to say, based on
general precepts about human behavior, it is highly unlikely that someone
who is within minutes or seconds of passing out would decide, after having
urinated in their pants, to have sex with an unknown taxi driver.
Unlike Judge Lenehan, trial judges in other cases have identified this
type of circumstantial evidence of non-consent by relying on basic, common
understandings about human sexual behavior.37 For example, in R v BSB, a
case which also involved a highly intoxicated complainant with memory loss,
Justice Romilly determined that evidence that the Complainant had vomited
prior to the sexual contact made it unbelievable that she had engaged in
passionate kissing with the accused: “[b]ased on the independent evidence
that the complainant had vomited, and human experience and logic, I have
great difficulty believing this evidence of the accused” that she had engaged
in passionate kissing.38 In convicting the accused, he concluded that: “the
Complainant’s vomiting, supports the inference that the complainant did
not consent to sexual intercourse with the accused.”39
iii) Following her usual routine
In addition to evidence of the Complainant’s severe intoxication, the Crown
also introduced other circumstantial evidence that the sexual touching
was not consensual. For example, the Complainant testified that she had
a routine she followed whenever she took a taxi home. She would typically
enter the car, sit in the backseat on the passenger side in order to “give
[the driver] some space”, say hello to the driver, tell him her address, and
then “get [her] money ready”—which for a taxi ride from where she was
downtown that night to her home would mean readying a $20 dollar bill.40
The police found a $20 dollar bill on the floor in the front, passenger side
of the vehicle, which Judge Lenehan accepted tended to indicate that the
complainant had followed her usual practice.41 Her testimony describing
her usual routine, considered in conjunction with the $20 dollar bill found
37
R v BSB, 2008 BCSC 917 at para 72, [2008] BCJ No 1319 (QL) [BSB], aff ’d 2009
BCCA 520, 71 CR (6th) 306; R v Kontzamanis, 2011 BCCA 184 at paras 38–39, [2011] BCJ
No 670 (QL) (jury reasonably relied on “collective human understanding of the behavior of a
young woman” to reject accused’s version of events).
38
BSB, supra note 37 at para 72.
39
Ibid at para 90.
40
Testimony of Complainant, supra note 6 at 14h:30m:42s.
41
Oral Decision, supra note 3. Judge Lenehan did note that her purse and jacket were
found on the front, passenger-side seat, which was not consistent with her usual routine.
However, he concluded that she could not have been sitting on that seat given that it had her
articles on it.
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in the car, constitutes circumstantial evidence of her intent to be driven
home that night, not taken in a different direction to an area of the city
where she knew no one, in order to have sex with the driver in his car.
iv) Emotional state: upset, crying, distraught
Judge Lenehan also heard testimony from both the Complainant’s best
friend and the best friend’s boyfriend that the Complainant was upset,
crying, and very emotional that night. Her best friend testified that as the
night progressed the Complainant became more drunk and more and more
upset.42 She described the Complainant as very sad, highly emotional,
and unwilling to accede to LI’s attempts to have her take a taxi home.43
She testified that after the bouncer precluded her from re-entering the bar
because she was too intoxicated, her friend found the Complainant outside
“crying heavily” and “upset”.44 The friend’s boyfriend testified that “as the
evening wore on she became more and more intoxicated as she drank more
and then obviously to the point where, uh, she was removed from the bar
and, you know, we couldn’t even get her a safe ride home because she was so,
um, distraught and upset.”45 The Crown introduced evidence of a text that
the Complainant sent less than 20 minutes before entering Al-Rawi’s taxi
advising another friend that she was not okay.46 Distraught, crying, very sad,
and upset: the Crown introduced unchallenged evidence indicating that
this was the emotional state that the Complainant was in when her friends
last observed, or heard from, her. Evidence that she was crying, distraught,
and very sad—perhaps inconsolable—shortly before entering the taxi is
circumstantial evidence of her state of mind when she was in the taxi. It
is evidence that supports the inference that the Complainant was not in
the emotional state that one would expect of someone who decides, upon
entering a taxi, to immediately consent to sexual contact with the unknown
driver.
Contrast Judge Lenehan’s failure to consider this circumstantial
evidence of lack of consent with the approach taken by Justice Dillon in a
British Columbia case that also involved a highly-intoxicated young woman
with a lack of memory regarding the sexual contact that occurred between
her and an unknown taxi driver. In R v Singh, Justice Dillon relied, in part,
on evidence that the intoxicated Complainant was upset and crying prior
to being taken to the accused’s home where the sexual contact occurred, to
42

Testimony of LI, supra note 8 at 15h:47m:34s to 15h:48m:33s.
Ibid at 15h:37m:20s to 15h:46m:10s.
44
Ibid at 15h:46m:40s.
45
R v Al-Rawi, Audio Trial Transcript: Testimony of C.O. (10 February 2017) Halifax
2866665 (NSPC) at 10h:16m:18s [Testimony of CO].
46
Testimony of Complainant, supra note 6 at 14h:23m:54s.
43
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conclude that “[i]t is highly unlikely that she would have consented to sex
with a complete stranger, a taxi driver with whom she had no conversation.”47
v) Short timeframe between entering taxi and sexual touching
In addition to the short period of time between the undisputed evidence
of her distraught emotional state and when she entered the taxi, the Crown
introduced evidence establishing that only 11 minutes passed between when
the Complainant entered the taxi in downtown Halifax and when the police
found her—naked from the breasts down, with Al-Rawi between her legs,
in the south-end of the city. The time frame in which these events occurred
makes it highly unlikely that the accused and the Complainant conversed in
any meaningful way, certainly before the decision to drive to a different area
of the city was made, but also before he stripped her of her clothing. The fact
that Al-Rawi was unknown to the Complainant and that there would have
been little, if any, discussion between them given the timeframe in which
events occurred, also constitutes circumstantial evidence of non-consent.
Again contrasting these two cases that share several facts, in R v Singh,
Justice Dillon (unlike Judge Lenehan) did identify the short window of time
between when the Complainant was upset and crying and when the sexual
contact occurred, the fact that the accused was previously unknown to the
Complainant, and the lack of discussion between the two, as circumstantial
evidence which gave rise to the inference that the Complainant did not
consent. She stated: “[i]t is a considerable stretch to conclude that K.B.
would have consented to sex with a taxi driver with whom she had no prior
conversation or knowledge, within eight minutes after she was extremely
upset, stumbling, visibly intoxicated and only wanted to go to her boyfriend’s
house.”48
vi) Attempt to hide her urine-soaked clothes and being in an
inexplicable area of the city
Judge Lenehan heard unchallenged evidence that the accused tried to hide
the Complainant’s pants and underwear when he became aware of the police
officer’s presence.49 He also heard unchallenged evidence that Al-Rawi,
47

2011 BCSC 1014 at paras 6, 35, [2012] BCJ No 2641 (QL) [Singh].
Supra note 47 at para 37. There was other circumstantial evidence available in
Singh, such as evidence that she had expressed a desire to find her boyfriend. So too was
there other circumstantial evidence introduced in Al-Rawi, such as the fact that she had lost
control of her bladder and urinated in her pants and underwear, that was not present in
Singh.
49
R v Al-Rawi, Audio Trial Transcript: Testimony of Constable Monia Thibault
(9 February 2017) Halifax 2866665 (NSPC) [Testimony of Cst Thibault]. Defence counsel
conceded in his closing address that Al-Rawi had tried to hide her clothes, although he argued
48
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rather than immediately exiting the vehicle when ordered to do so, first tried
to hide the Complainant’s shoes, which were on the floor in front of him, on
the front, driver’s side of the car. This evidence of Al-Rawi’s “after-the-fact
conduct” also supports the inference that the Complainant did not consent
to the removal of her clothes.50
Moreover, Judge Lenehan had before him evidence that the accused had
driven the Complainant to, and parked on, a poorly lit, residential street
at 1:20 a.m., in a part of the city that one would not pass through on the
way to the Complainant’s home.51 The location where Al-Rawi was found
with the Complainant, when considered in conjunction with his efforts to
conceal her clothing and shoes, also constitutes circumstantial evidence
of an intention to, or an awareness of having, engaged in non-consensual
sexual touching.52
Unlike Judge Lenehan, in R v Palani, another case involving an
intoxicated young woman and a much older, unknown taxi driver, Justice
Nadel did point to the Crown’s evidence that the accused had inexplicably
diverted from the logical route and parked in a dark and secluded location
as evidence of non-consent: “unless there is an innocuous or innocent
reason for [the accused] driving off the main thoroughfare of [G Street] and
stopping his taxi behind a row of businesses, that diversion is a telling piece
of evidence against him.53

that this did not necessarily suggest consciousness of guilt but rather an awareness of how the
situation would look to an outsider.
50
R v White, 2011 SCC 13, [2011] 1 SCR 433 at para 22: “The principle that after-thefact conduct may constitute circumstantial evidence of guilt remains good law. At its heart,
the question of whether such evidence is admissible is simply a matter of relevance”.
51
Constable Thibault described Atlantic Street at that time of night (where she
found the accused and the Complainant) as “pretty dark” (Testimony of Cst Thibault, supra
note 49 at 11h:44m:31s). She noted that none of the houses had their porch lights on.
52
In R v Aulakh, 2010 BCSC 1026 at para 43, [2010] BCJ No 1457 (QL) [Aulakh],
aff ’d 2012 BCCA 340, 295 CCC (3d) 315, which also involved a sexual assault by a taxi driver
of an intoxicated woman with very little memory of what had occurred, Justice Ehrcke
based his decision to convict primarily on circumstantial evidence, including evidence that
the accused had stopped the taxi in a secluded area of the city at a time of day when most
people would be asleep (ibid at para 36). While the main issue in Aulakh involved identity,
not consent—thus the probative value of the evidence was different than in Al-Rawi—Justice
Ehrcke pointed to evidence that the accused had driven the complainant to a location where
they would be less likely to encounter passersby as circumstantial evidence that it was the
accused who had engaged in non-consensual intercourse with the complainant (ibid at para
43).
53
2013 ONCJ 12 at para 20, [2013] OJ No 170 (QL).
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To summarize, Judge Lenehan failed to identify any of this circumstantial
evidence demonstrating the profound implausibility that this emotionally
distraught, crying and upset young woman entered a taxi and either
immediately, or within 6 minutes, consented to sexual activity with the
unknown, 40-year-old driver. He acquitted on the basis that there was no
evidence of lack of consent and that the Complainant “might very well have
been capable of appearing … able to … consent.”54 Setting aside that, in this
part of Judge Lenehan’s decision, he misstated the legal test for capacity to
consent—which again, is not based on whether she appeared able to consent
but rather whether she was, in fact, able to consent—the determination
that there was no evidence of lack of consent was simply wrong. Perhaps
his focus on the issue of capacity led to his failure to recognize any of this
evidence of non-consent. As Janine Benedet has observed of cases in which
a complainant is intoxicated:
The focus on incapacity can obscure other evidence of non-consent or of coercive
circumstances that should call consent into question, such as differences in age,
physical size … or other factors. Thus, when the court decides capacity is present,
intoxication as a factor falls away and is treated as no longer relevant. This is not
correct in law because even where the complainant has the capacity to consent, her
intoxication is still relevant to the voluntariness of that consent.55

Judge Lenehan erred in law by concluding that there was “absolutely no
evidence” on the issue of non-consent.56 His repeated assertion that it did
not exist suggests that he either outright ignored the Crown’s evidence of
non-consent (despite having noted the existence of at least some of it in his
decision) or that he did not recognize that evidence of severe intoxication and
other factors constitutes circumstantial evidence of non-consent. Whether
he ignored the Crown’s evidence, or failed to recognize its legal significance,
Judge Lenehan’s treatment of the evidence was legally incorrect.
To be clear, the problem with Judge Lenehan’s decision raised in this
section is not that he failed to give proper, or any, weight to the Crown’s
evidence of non-consent, or that his decision to acquit based on the evidence
as a whole was unreasonable (both of which also occurred in this case). The
problem identified here is that his approach to the evidence was not legally
correct. Contrary to Judge Lenehan’s assertions, the Crown did introduce
substantial evidence of non-consent.
54

Oral Decision, supra note 3 at 13h:55m:47s.
Benedet, supra note 18 at 459.
56
Oral Decision, supra note 3 at 13h:55m:28s. See e.g. JMH, supra note 28.
See e.g. R v Rudge, 2011 ONCA 791 at para 47, [2011] OJ No 5709 (QL):“the prosecution
is entitled to a legally correct approach to the evidence that bears upon the determination of
whether the onus has been met”.
55
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C) Speculation Based on Stereotype
In addition to these legal errors, Judge Lenehan’s decision included
speculation that the Complainant consented to, and perhaps even initiated,
the sexual contact that occurred. He stated: “[i]f [the Complainant]
consented to Mr. Al-Rawi’s removal of her clothes, Mr. Al-Rawi was under a
moral or ethical obligation to decline the invitation … He knew going along
with any flirtation on her part involved him taking advantage of a vulnerable
person.”57 Was the inference that this emotionally distraught young woman
consented to having her pants and underwear removed, her legs spread
apart and propped up on the seatbacks in front of her, on a public street, in
a taxi cab, by a man she had met only minutes before, based on the evidence
adduced in this trial open to Judge Lenehan? The answer is no.58
In order to convict an accused of sexual assault the Crown must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused intentionally engaged in nonconsensual touching of a sexual nature.59 Judge Lenehan found that AlRawi removed the Complainant’s pants and underwear. In the context of
this case, such conduct constitutes intentional touching of a sexual nature.
Judge Lenehan acquitted on the basis that the Crown failed to introduce any
evidence that this sexual touching was non-consensual. As explained above,
in doing so he either ignored the significant circumstantial evidence of lack
of consent or misapprehended its legal significance. Accused individuals
can be convicted on circumstantial evidence if the only reasonable inference
to be drawn from that evidence is that the accused is guilty.60 In other words,
“[t]he issue with respect to circumstantial evidence is the range of reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from it. If there are reasonable inferences other
than guilt, the Crown’s evidence does not meet the standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.”61 A reasonable inference that the sexual touching at
issue in a sexual assault case was consensual does not have to arise from
57
Oral Decision, supra note 3 at 13h:54m:38s. Of note, this statement reflects yet
another legal error in his decision. Given the Complainant’s level of intoxication, had she
engaged in the type of behavior speculated by Judge Lenehan, Al-Rawi’s obligation would
not have been merely ethical or moral, but also legal. An accused is not entitled to rely on
a mistaken belief in the complainant’s capacity to consent (or actual consent) unless he has
taken reasonable steps in the circumstances known to him to ascertain that she has capacity
(and is consenting). See Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 273.2. See also R v Spicer, 2015 ABCA
190, 397 DLR (4th) 194 (error in jury charge on legal requirements of defence of mistaken
belief in consent at paras 3–4).
58
I am grateful to my colleague Steve Coughlan, both for drawing this point to my
attention and identifying for me the salient legal precedent.
59
Ewanchuk, supra note 26 at paras 25–26.
60
R v Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33 at paras 30, 35, [2016] 1 SCR 1000 [Villaroman].
61
Ibid at para 35.
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proven facts; it can arise from a lack of evidence.62 However, it has to be a
reasonable inference. It must be “based on reason and common sense which
must be logically based upon the evidence or lack of evidence” available.63
In other words, inferences must be reasonable, not just possible.64 Judge
Lenehan had substantial circumstantial evidence to support the inference
that the sexual touching was non-consensual. He had no evidence before
him to support the inference that the Complainant consented to sexual
contact with the accused. While a lack of evidence of consent is certainly
not fatal to the accused (who is entitled to a presumption of innocence) a
reasonable doubt cannot arise from speculation or conjecture drawn from
hypothetical scenarios. It must be based on the application of reason and
common understanding to the evidence, or lack of evidence, introduced at
trial.
On what basis could a trial judge reasonably infer, in the absence of
any evidence, that this severely intoxicated, emotionally distraught young
woman entered a taxi, driven by a man unknown to her, and within minutes
agreed to have her pants and underwear removed, her legs spread apart,
her feet elevated to straddle the vehicle’s front seats?65 How could any trier
of fact consider this to be a reasonable inference? The reality is that an
inference of this kind defies logic. To draw an inference of consent in the
face of the circumstantial evidence of non-consent presented in this case,
would require reliance on the legally-rejected stereotype that women, in
the right circumstances (in this case, the circumstance of intoxication), will
consent to sex with anyone.66 It should not need to be stated that inferences
based on legally-rejected stereotypes—such as the notion of the “unchaste
woman”, ready and willing upon consumption of alcohol to consent to sex
with anyone, anywhere—are not reasonable.
3. The Role of Stereotype in R v Al-Rawi
How could such a pornographic, hypersexualized account of human female
behavior arise in a legal proceeding in 2017? A review of the testimony and
closing submissions offered at trial suggests at least one possible source: AlRawi’s defence lawyer, Luke Craggs.67
62

Ibid.
Ibid at para 36, citing R v Lifchus, [1997] 3 SCR 320 at para 30, 118 CCC (3d) 1.
64
Villaroman, supra note 60 at para 42.
65
Oral decision, supra note 3 at 13h:57m:26s: The Complainant “might very well
have been capable of appearing lucid but drunk and able to direct, agree or consent to any
number of different activities”.
66
R v Seaboyer, [1991] 2 SCR 577 at 685–86, 66 CCC (3d) 321, L’Heureux-Dubé J
(dissenting in part, but not on this issue) [Seaboyer].
67
The use of the names of the defence lawyer and Crown Attorney in this case is
motivated by a desire to avoid the obfuscation and distancing that occurs when we speak
63
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The theory of the defence in this case, reiterated during the crossexaminations of four Crown witnesses and emphasized in Craggs’ closing
submissions, appears to have been that when Jane68* (the Complainant)
consumes alcohol she becomes a different “type of person”.69 She is a “Jekyll
and Hyde,” to use defence counsel’s words.70 Arguably, Craggs’ questions
and submissions throughout the trial suggest an effort not simply to portray
the Complainant as drunk and less inhibited on the night of the incident,
but to construct an alternate personality—“Drunk Jane” 71—devoid of any
inhibition. In his cross-examination of the Complainant, Craggs asserted:
Defence: You don’t necessarily remember the type of person you become when
you’re … [drunk]?
Complainant: … I can only speculate[.]
Defence: When you are sober you are a very together person … you can handle
real life responsibility … [B]ut the Drunk Jane is very, very different than the sober,
sensible person who works for [________], right?
Complainant: I don’t know.72

only of roles and institutions, rather than individuals. When we speak only in terms of roles
and institutions, the contrast between the profoundly personal exposure of the complainant
that occurs during the sexual assault trial process and the faceless and nameless actors of the
justice system becomes simply too stark. In addition, accountability is a bedrock principle of
our justice system and can only occur through the critique and amelioration of the conduct
of the individual actors who practice within it.
*Pseudonym.
68
69
R v Al-Rawi, Audio Trial Transcript: Defence Closing Submissions (10 February
2017) Halifax 2866665 (NSPC) at 13h:49m:48s [Defence Closing]. His questioning of
Constable Thibault included: “[A]nd there are plenty of drunks downtown at that time of day,
right? … [S]ometimes they do foolish and erratic things, right?” (Testimony of Cst Thibault,
supra note 49 at 11h:52m:29s). In his cross-examination of the Complainant, he suggested
that she becomes a different type of person when intoxicated (Testimony of Complainant,
supra note 6).
70
Defence Closing, ibid at 13h:49m:59s. See below for the wording in an excerpt of
the closing address.
71
Defence counsel made reference to “Drunk Jane” and contrasted “Drunk Jane” with
“Sober, Sensible Jane” more than once during the trial. See e.g. Testimony of Complainant,
supra note 6 at 15h:25m:07s; Testimony of LI, supra note 9 at 16h:02m:33s; Testimony of CO,
supra note 45 at 10h:19m:17s. To be clear, Jane is being used here as a pseudonym. In his
cross-examinations, defence counsel used the complainant’s real name: “Drunk _____”.
72
Testimony of Complainant, supra note 6 at 15h:24m:42s. It is true that the
Complainant testified in chief that she has “very poor judgment” as a “not sober person” (ibid
at 14h:34m:15s). When asked during cross-examination to clarify what she meant by this, she
suggested she meant bad judgment about how much alcohol to consume (ibid at 15h:06m:44s).
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In his cross-examination of the Complainant’s roommate and childhood
friend, Craggs’ suggested that the Complainant “seemed reasonable and
coherent up until a certain point” and then “her demeanor totally changed?
... [S]he went from, if I can say it, Sober, Sensible Jane to Drunk Jane?
[Witness:] Yes.”73 In questioning the roommate’s boyfriend, Craggs again
asserted that her demeanor “changed from Sober, Sensible Jane to Drunk,
not sensible, Jane.”74 In his closing submissions, defence counsel argued:
The staid and sensible Jane … apparently becomes a very different person when
she drinks in the quantity that she drank that night, um and that is something the
court sees all the time. I’ve heard judges use the term “Jekyll and Hyde” personalities
between the sober and the drunk person.75

Craggs suggested that this case “is really about the inferences that can be
drawn from [the] evidence.”76 The inference he invited Judge Lenehan
to draw was that the Complainant is a woman transformed by the
consumption of alcohol into an irrational, uninhibited person, who might
quite imaginably enter the taxi of an unknown man, and immediately (or
almost immediately) remove her clothing, throw her shoes, urine-soaked
pants and underwear at him, and perhaps kiss or lick his face:77
I would submit the more logical inference which is consistent with all of the evidence
is that Ms. _______, intoxicated, uninhibited, exercising questionable judgment, did
something to Mr. Al-Rawi to get [her DNA] on his face, maybe a kiss, maybe licking
his face, something that deposited her DNA on his face … it could be urine from
her wet pants, there any number of inferences that could be drawn from the DNA
evidence … the logical inference, the likely inference, is actually inconsistent with
an assault.78
73

Testimony of LI, supra note 9 at 16h:02m:14s.
Testimony of CO, supra note 45 at 10h:19m:23s.
75
Defence Closing, supra note 69 at 13h:49m:39s.
76
Ibid at 13h:46m:51s.
77
In his cross-examination of the Complainant, defence counsel suggested to her
that she took her shoes, pants and underwear off in the back of the taxi, threw them into
the front seat and then suggested to Al-Rawi that she might be interested in having sex with
him. He asked the following questions: “Do you recall having a discussion with the taxi
driver in which he essentially said: ‘Listen pay your fare, get out…’?”, “Do you remember,
um, taking your pants off in the back of the taxi and throwing them up front?”, “Do you
remember throwing your shoes up front into the front seat of the taxi?”, “Do you remember
suggesting to the taxi driver that you may be interested in having sex with him?” (Testimony
of Complainant, supra note 6 at 15h:21m:12s). In his cross-examination of the toxicologist,
Craggs asked whether individuals become “more amorous or aggressive” in approaching
people when intoxicated. The toxicologist agreed. (Testimony of Tracy Cherlet, supra note 7
at 11h:52m:44s).
78
Defence Closing, supra note 69 at 13h:54m:14s.
74
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…
The reasonable inference which is consistent with Ms ____’s demeanor and her
placement in the car is that she pulled that shirt up on her own[.]79
…
It is reasonable to infer from all of the evidence that Ms _____ drunkenly removed
her own clothing and threw it at Mr. Al-Rawi and threw it in the front of the car.80
…
Ms. ______ would, I would submit, never in a sober state do anything of the type
that she did on the evening in question.81

Recall the physical position in which the Complainant was found by
Constable Thibault: her legs propped up on the front seats, spread wide
enough to have Al-Rawi in between them. Defence counsel submitted
that, as matter of logic given Al-Rawi’s location in the vehicle, it was more
reasonable to infer that before passing out the Complainant placed herself in
this position—that she “just put them [her legs] up there for some reason”—
than to infer that Al-Rawi moved her into this position after she had passed
out.82 Of note, his claim that Al-Rawi’s location in the front seat of the car
makes it unlikely that he was physically able to spread her legs in a straddle
position (or perform a sexual act on her, which he also suggested) seems to
ignore (as did Judge Lenehan’s decision) Constable Thibault’s unchallenged
evidence that she saw Al-Rawi between the Complainant’s naked legs, facing
towards the back of the car, as well as the evidence that Al-Rawi’s seat was
reclined.83

79
Ibid at 13h:56m:02s. It is not clear whether he was suggesting that the most
reasonable inference is that she pulled her shirt up intentionally. Earlier in the proceeding, he
suggested that she positioned herself in the car in a way that may have pushed her shirt up,
partially exposing her breasts.
80
Ibid at 14h:10m:25s.
81
Ibid at 14h:10m:56s.
82
Ibid at 13h:57m:37s.
83
According to Constable Thibault, when she arrived she found the accused in
between the Complainant’s legs: “Her legs were up over [the seat] and they were open … one
on each [seat] … open enough to have somebody between them” (Testimony of Cst Thibault,
supra note 49 at 11h:26m:15s). Under cross-examination, Constable Thibault reiterated that
she saw the accused between the Complainant’s legs: “What I saw was … Mr. Al Rarwi [sic],
um, turned, facing the back of the vehicle, in between legs, so I - and then the female had no
pants on” (ibid at 12h:07m:17s).
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The theory of the defence was revealed early in the proceeding, during
his cross-examination of the Complainant.84 Arguably, the Crown Attorney
in this case, Ron Lacey, should have objected to Craggs’ reliance on this
type of propensity-based argument about the Complainant’s alternate
personality—“Drunk Jane”85—as soon as it was raised. Moreover, even if
one does not agree that Lacey should have objected, at a minimum, during
his closing submissions, he should have flagged for the trial judge that it
would be both inappropriate and erroneous to infer that “Drunk Jane”86 was
the type of person who would engage in the behavior suggested by defence
counsel. While both the Complainant and her friend testified, or agreed
in cross-examination, that she acted differently when she was drunk—for
example by laughing a lot, exercising very poor judgment about how many
drinks to consume, becoming more argumentative, less cautious, or more
emotional—neither of them gave any evidence about her behavior after
consuming alcohol that would warrant the types of inferences urged by
defence counsel.87
Upon what evidence did the defence rely to argue in favour of the
inference that “Drunk Jane”88 entered a taxi and immediately, or almost
immediately, removed her urine-soaked underwear and pants, threw them
at Al-Rawi, perhaps kissed or licked his face, and then for some reason spread
her legs by propping her feet up on the front seats in a straddle position?
84

Testimony of Complainant, supra note 6.
Defence Closing, supra note 69.
86
Ibid. For a discussion on the role and responsibilities of the Crown, see Alice
Woolley, Understanding Legal Ethics in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2016), ch 9
[Woolley].
87
See e.g. Testimony of LI, supra note 9 at 15h:47m:34s (describing the Complainant
becoming more emotional); Testimony of Complainant, supra note 6 at 15h:23m:18s
(describing becoming less cautious and exercising poor judgment regarding the number
of drinks she consumed). The Complainant also testified in direct examination that she
has very poor judgment when she is drunk (Testimony of Complainant, supra note 6 at
14h:34m:35s). She did not provide any examples of this in direct, but when asked during
cross-examination what she meant by “very poor judgment”, she testified that she wouldn’t
necessarily remember because she was drunk, but in general she meant poor judgment
about how many alcoholic drinks to consume (ibid at 15h:06m:44s). She also testified during
direct examination that she loses control when intoxicated. However, this statement was in
response to a question from the Crown asking about her ability to function given her level
of intoxication (ibid at 14h:28m:31s). In cross-examination defence counsel asked her about
losing control. She agreed that “people in general when they drink too much lose control” and
she includes herself in that category. Defence counsel asked her if she becomes less inhibited
when she is intoxicated. Instead of answering this question, she asked him to repeat it, and
when he did he changed the words “less inhibited” to “less cautious” (ibid at 15h:22s:00s).
There was nothing in her evidence to suggest that by poor judgment, or loss of control, she
meant engaging in the kind of behavior suggested by the defence.
88
Supra note 71.
85
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Craggs relied, in part, on evidence that she had danced “inappropriately”
and flirted earlier that evening while drinking and socializing at the bar.89
Craggs first raised the issue of her alleged flirtation with men at the
bar in his cross-examination of the Complainant. He read from a statement
to the police given by her roommate’s boyfriend, CO, in which CO said:
“[U]h, I mean she was, she was getting quite intoxicated for sure you know,
um, very flirtatious with different people around, you know, around the
venues stuff like that but I, we didn’t interact much, I don’t feel, you know,
we weren’t talking a lot … I mean she was quite intoxicated.”90 Craggs asked
the Complainant:
Defence: Does any of what I’ve just read to you from CO’s statement sound familiar?
Complainant: No.
Defence: Okay so it’s, I mean are you, I just want to be clear are you saying it’s untrue
or you just don’t remember because you can’t comment on it either way because that
is part of where you blacked out?
Complainant: I can’t comment.91

Craggs returned to this evidence that the Complainant was flirtatious or
inappropriate earlier that night at the bar, prior to entering Al-Rawi’s taxi,
during his cross-examination of CO:
Defence: From what you have told us, I get the impression that sometime after you
arrived at Boomers her demeanor changed from sober, sensible Jane to drunk, not
sensible Jane, is that a fair way to characterize it?
Witness: Yes.
Defence: And you believe that she was … not sensible because she was being
irrational and arguing with LI, your girlfriend?
Witness: Yes.
89

In his closing submissions, defence counsel suggested that the trial judge should
keep in mind evidence that she was irrational, wanting to keep the party fun going, and that
she had “stepped over a line” when dancing with CO, as he assessed all of the other evidence
(Defence Closing, supra note 69 at 13h:51m:15s).
90
Testimony of Complainant, supra note 6 at 15h:13m:33s.
91
Ibid at 15h:14m:02s. It should also be noted that defence counsel appears to have
entered this out-of-court statement for the truth of its contents. Even setting aside the issue
of prior sexual activity evidence, the Crown should have objected when defence counsel put
CO’s police statement to the Complainant and asked her to comment on its accuracy.
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…
Defence: You also described her, and, and I think you were suggesting it was
improper and inappropriate and not like sober Jane, uh, her as being flirtatious.
Can you just describe more specifically what she did that led you to that conclusion?
Witness: Uh, not necessarily improper but, you know, when any individual drinks
alcohol their, their inhibitions are lowered so they are going to be more flirtatious
and do things, but, uh, you know, she was dancing with people, strangers, myself,
and, uh, at the bar.92

He continued to press the witness on whether the Complainant had been
flirtatious or inappropriate, referring CO to his police statement:
Defence: “I’m just going to read it out loud just so that everyone knows what we’re
talking about here, it says, according to this you say:
‘[W]e were all dancing together, uh, I think LI and I, Jane was trying to dance with
me for a little bit … and I kinda was not really super excited about that’.
Do you remember saying that?
Witness: Yeah.
Defence: Okay, um, can you tell us why you were not super excited about Jane
dancing with you?
Witness: Uh, well, I was dating LI, her … best friend, and I didn’t want any disputes
between the two of them. I don’t know how either of them would react to it. So, I just
wanted to keep it nice and friendly.
Defence: Okay alright was the, was her dancing with you, was it in a manner that
was perhaps a bit more, how shall I say? Forward, than just standing in front of you
and moving her body a bit?
Witness: Honestly, I don’t recall.
Defence: Okay. But it appears that your impression here [in his statement to police],
the impression it left you with is that she was stepping over a line by either dancing
with you or how she was dancing with you, right?
Witness: Uh. Perhaps.

92

Testimony of CO, supra note 45 at 10h:19m:17s.
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Defence: Alright Mr. O, those are all my questions.93

Defence counsel should not have asked these questions, either of the
Complainant or of CO. The introduction of this evidence was not consistent
with Canada’s rape shield laws under sections 276 and 276.1 of the Criminal
Code.94 Section 276 creates exclusionary rules which make evidence of prior
sexual history presumptively inadmissible. The defence must bring a written
application seeking the court’s authorization before attempting to introduce
evidence of a complainant’s other sexual activity.95 Courts are prohibited
from granting such applications if the evidence the defence seeks to admit
is being introduced to support an inference that, by reason of the sexual
nature of the activity, the Complainant is less credible or more likely to have
consented to the sexual activity at issue in the allegation.96 The defence did
not bring a section 276.1 application in this case.
The Crown should have objected when Craggs, during his crossexamination of the Complainant, introduced this evidence that she had been
flirtatious earlier that night in the bar. He should have objected when Craggs
returned to this evidence during his cross-examination of CO. Instead,
the defence pursued this line of questioning with CO, despite the witness’
seeming reluctance to characterize the Complainant’s dancing as improper
or inappropriate, without any objection from Lacey. Nor did the Crown,
in his closing submission, mitigate the impact of this evidence by urging
Judge Lenehan not to give it any weight, and emphasizing for him that it
would be an error of law to infer that “Drunk Jane’s”97 supposed propensity
to act in flirtatious or “inappropriate” ways made it more likely she stripped
off her pants and underwear (or agreed to their removal), kissed or licked
Al-Rawi, or spread her naked legs to straddle the front seats of the vehicle.
Crown Attorneys have an obligation to ensure that criminal prosecutions
are conducted through a process that is fair to the accused, the complainant,
and the public.98 It is incumbent upon the Crown to object when defence
93

Ibid at 10h:21m:55s.
Supra note 5.
95
Ibid, s 276.1
96
Ibid, s 276(1)(a).
97
Supra note 71.
98
See e.g. Boucher v The Queen, [1955] SCR 16, 110 CCC 263. Ontario states this
explicitly in its Crown policy manual. Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Role of
the Crown—Preamble to the Crown Policy Manual, October 2015 update (Toronto: Ministry
of the Attorney General, 21 March 2005) at 3, online: <www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/
english/crim/cpm/2005/CPMPreamble.pdf>: “Crown counsel, as key participants in
the criminal justice system, play an important role in assisting to overcome any forms of
discrimination that deny equal access to the criminal justice system. Crown counsel take a
leadership role in ensuring that various forms of discrimination … are not reflected in the
criminal justice system”.
94
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lawyers attempt to introduce evidence of prior sexual activity without having
obtained the trial judge’s permission as a result of a successful application
under section 276.1.
Trial judges also have a responsibility to ensure the proper application
and enforcement of the legal rules created to protect sexual assault
complainants. They have an obligation to intervene if defence counsel
attempt to introduce evidence without complying with the requirements
under sections 276 and 276.1. With both the Complainant and CO, the
defence asked more than one question about her supposed flirtation in the
bar that night. Despite ample opportunity to intervene, Judge Lenehan did
nothing to prevent the introduction of this evidence. While trial judges must
be very careful not to intercede in a manner that compromises the accused’s
right of cross-examination, or raises the appearance of any bias, attempts
to introduce prior sexual activity evidence without the court’s approval
under section 276 is clearly a context in which judicial intervention is both
necessary and appropriate.99
While the case law on the definition of sexual activity is not extensive,
both trial and appellate level courts in Canada have recognized that “sexual
activity” is not limited to overtly sexual acts.100 Interpreting “sexual activity”
for the purposes of section 163 of the Criminal Code, the Supreme Court of
Canada stated in R v Sharpe: “Sexual activity spans a large spectrum, ranging
from the flirtatious glance at one end, through touching of body parts
incidentally related to sex, like hair, lips and breasts, to sexual intercourse
and touching of the genitals and the anal region.”101 The Ontario Court of
Justice, in a case involving charges of assault causing bodily harm and forcible

99
See Woolley, supra note 85 at 895 (noting that the introduction of prior sexual
history evidence without approval of the court is outside the scope of permitted crossexamination, because it has the “potential to undermine the fairness and accuracy of the trial
process”).
100 For decisions in which section 276 was applied to this type of evidence, see R
v Drakes (1998), 122 CCC (3d) 498, 1998 CanLII 14968 (BCCA) at para 16; R v Clark, 87
OAC 178, 1995 CanLII 1474 at para 3 [Clark] (evidence of flirtation excluded under section
276); R v Zachariou, 2013 ONSC 6694 at paras 18–21, [2013] OJ No 4899 (QL) (discussion
of threesomes at bar constituted evidence of sexual activity for purposes of section 276). But
see R v Beilhartz, 2013 ONSC 5670, 6 CR (7th) 79 [Beilhartz] (trial judge found evidence of
complainant draping her legs over the accused did not constitute sexual activity). Professor
Janine Benedet argues that Beilhartz was wrongly decided (see annotation in Beilhartz in CR,
infra). Moreover, it should be noted that in Beilhartz, unlike in this case, the evidence was
introduced as relevant to a mistaken belief in consent, rather than consent itself. See also R v
Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2, [2001] 1 SCR 45 [Sharpe].
101 Supra note 100 at para 44.

204

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[Vol. 95

confinement, relied upon the Supreme Court of Canada’s conclusion that
evidence of flirtation is evidence of sexual activity in R v Ayenun.102
The use to which this evidence appears to have been put in Al-Rawi is
similar to that in cases in which evidence of this nature has been excluded
under section 276. For example, in R v Clark, the Ontario Court of Appeal
concluded that evidence of flirting at social events was properly excluded
under section 276.103 Defence counsel in that case brought an application
to introduce this evidence in order to demonstrate that the Complainant
would become “sexually aggressive after drinking alcohol,” which the
defence argued supported the accused’s position that she had consented to
the sexual activity at issue in the allegation.104 The Ontario Court of Appeal
upheld the trial judge’s determination that such evidence was inadmissible
pursuant to section 276.
It is possible that neither legal counsel, nor the trial judge in AlRawi, recognized that evidence that the Complainant was “flirtatious”,105
“improper and inappropriate”106 with men at the bar, or dancing in a
manner that “step[ped] over a line”107 should have been subject to section
276 scrutiny. In other words, they may have assumed that the definition of
sexual activity under section 276 does not include evidence of flirtation or
inappropriate dancing. It is true that the case law on this issue is not robust.
However, even if they failed to recognize the applicability of section 276—
or did consider the provision, but rejected the contention that evidence of
102 2013 ONCJ 260 at para 32, [2013] OJ No 2217 (QL): “[Section] 276 is to apply to
all sexual activity on the part of the complainant, whether with an accused or with someone
else. It is of significance to this case that sexual activity includes “flirting”.” The Court cited
Sharpe, supra note 100 at para 44, and applied this statement in an assault causing bodily
harm case, in consideration of whether the common law excludes evidence of an accused’s
flirtatious behavior on the basis that its probative value relies on twin myth reasoning
and would distort the truth-seeking process, just as it would were it to be evidence of the
complainant’s flirtatious behavior.
103 Clark, supra note 100 at para 3.
104 Ibid at para 3. The notion that an individual may become sexually aggressive after
consuming alcohol also arose in Al-Rawi. For example, defence counsel asked the Crown’s
expert witness whether it was true that individuals who consume alcohol may be more
“amorous or aggressive approaching a person who they might not normally approach.” The
toxicologist agreed that someone who has consumed alcohol may approach someone in a bar
that they would not approach if they were sober (Testimony of Tracy Cherlet, supra note 7 at
11h:52m:44s). Craggs’ theory of the case as a whole portrays the Complainant as the initiator,
if not aggressor.
105 Excerpt of CO’s statement to the police read aloud by defence counsel during
Testimony of Complainant, supra note 6 at 15h:13m:33s; Testimony of CO, supra note 45 at
10h:20m:12s.
106 Testimony of CO, supra note 45 at 10h:20m:12s.
107 Ibid at 10h:22m:55s.
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flirtation and inappropriate dancing is sexual activity for the purposes of
section 276—this evidence still should have been excluded on the basis that
it was irrelevant and likely to be prejudicial.108 As explained below, absent
reliance on legally-rejected stereotypes, whether the Complainant was
flirting and dancing inappropriately in a bar prior to getting into Al-Rawi’s
taxi is not probative of whether she took her clothes off and attempted to
initiate sex with him.
Had Craggs brought a section 276.1 application, or had the Crown
objected when he asked these questions of CO and the Complainant,
Craggs would have been required to demonstrate that the relevance of
this evidence was not reliant, for its probative value, on the inference that
the Complainant’s flirtatious behavior earlier in the evening made it more
likely that she: removed her own clothing, indicated to Al-Rawi that she
may be interested in having sex, or licked or tried to kiss Al-Rawi later
that night. Craggs would have been required to identify the evidence’s
relevance on some other basis, and demonstrate that its probative value
was not outweighed by the prejudicial effect of allowing this evidence.109
Had he brought an application before introducing this prior sexual activity
evidence, Craggs likely would have argued that the evidence was not being
introduced in order to trigger the inference that the Complainant was more
likely to have consented to (or initiated) the sexual touching in the taxi, but
rather to demonstrate that Jane was acting differently than she acts when she
is sober. This would not have been a compelling justification for admitting
this evidence.
First, there was other evidence showing that the Complainant
acted differently when drunk, making the prior sexual activity evidence
unnecessary. Second, there is nothing unique or particularly noteworthy
about this evidence sufficient to suggest that its probative value would
outweigh its prejudicial effect: dancing and flirting is often what occurs
in bars. Third, while it is impossible to know upon what basis the defence
would have argued that this evidence was admissible, had he brought an
application, or had the Crown objected, it seems reasonable to conclude
(based on the defence’s closing submissions) that in fact this evidence was
introduced in order to portray the Complainant as the “type of person”110
who, when drunk, would lick or kiss an unknown taxi driver, and strip off
her pants and underwear, throwing them at him.
108 R v Osolin, [1993] 4 SCR 595 at 665, 86 CCC (3d) 481: “[T]he right to crossexamination … must conform to the basic principle that all evidence must be relevant in
order to be admissible. In addition the probative value of evidence must be weighed against
its prejudicial effect.” For a comprehensive examination of the legal constraints placed on
cross-examination, see Woolley, supra note 85 at 393.
109 Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 276(2)(c).
110 Testimony of Complainant, supra note 6.
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If the defence had brought a section 276 application, or if the Crown
had objected, it seems very likely that Judge Lenehan would have been
required to exclude this evidence.111 The inference that a complainant’s
flirtatious behavior in a bar with one man increases the likelihood that she
later attempted to initiate sexual touching with another man is precisely the
kind of problematic reasoning that section 276 aims to eliminate from sexual
assault trials. Only on the basis of stereotypes about so-called “promiscuous
women” could one decide that the fact that a woman danced in a suggestive
manner with her friend’s boyfriend, or flirted with a man in a bar, makes
it more likely that she stripped her clothes off, propped her legs up in a
straddle position, and perhaps kissed or licked the face of an unknown cab
driver within minutes of meeting him.
Adding, as the defence did, a layer to the narrative that suggests that it is
only upon the consumption of alcohol that a particular woman, in this case
Jane, becomes the “type of person”112 that flirts in bars, dances suggestively,
and strips her clothes off in front of an unknown cab driver, does not alter
the role that stereotype plays in establishing the supposed relevance of this
evidence. Arguably, defence counsel’s assertion that the logical inference to
draw from the evidence offered at trial is that “Drunk Jane”113 entered this
taxi, stripped her clothes off, threw them at Al-Rawi, and perhaps kissed
or licked his face, is also reliant on the “promiscuous party girl” stereotype.
The logic of this stereotype turns on the assumption that drunk women will
have sex with anyone, anywhere, anytime—that the consumption of alcohol
does not simply lower the party girl’s inhibitions, it removes them entirely.
To borrow from Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s decision in Seaboyer, this type of
thinking is “implicitly based upon the notion that women will, in the right
circumstances [in this case the consumption of alcohol], consent to anyone
and, more fundamentally, that “unchaste” women have a propensity to
consent.”114 In R v Mabior, the Supreme Court of Canada characterized such
thinking as “crabbed” and cited Ewanchuk (its pivotal decision on consent)
for the proposition that “judges may not infer consent from the way the
complainant was dressed or the fact that she may have flirted.”115

111 At a minimum, if Judge Lenehan had allowed this evidence to be introduced
following a section 276 hearing, in order to demonstrate that the Complainant was intoxicated
(which I would argue would have been wrong) there would presumably have been discussion
on, and emphasis about, the need to ensure that it not be used to further the inference that
the Complainant consented to, or initiated, the sexual touching that occurred in the taxi.
112 Testimony of Complainant, supra note 6.
113 Supra note 71.
114 Supra note 66 at 685–86 (dissenting, but not on this issue) [quotation marks in
original].
115 R v Mabior, 2012 SCC 47 at para 47, [2012] 2 SCR 584.
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Yet the defence appears to have invited Judge Lenehan to draw precisely
this inference in his closing submissions, suggesting that the trial judge
should “assess all of the evidence” in light of the Complainant’s irrationality,
desire to party, and manner of dancing earlier in the evening:
You’ll recall her friends talking about her being essentially irrational, about her
expressing a desire to continue on with the sort of party fun nature of the evening.
Her friends really thinking better of that idea …You’ll also recall from Mr. O
testifying this morning about how, his—I forget the exact term he used, but there
was some displeasure or discomfort with [Jane] dancing with him. It was suggested
to him [by defence counsel] that she had stepped over a line and he agreed with
that. So Ms. [Jane] was behaving differently than she normally does, and certainly
differently than she does in the witness box, and that is important to keep in the back
of your mind as you assess all of this evidence.116

It is clear from this statement that by “behaving differently” Craggs meant,
in part, dancing in a manner that “stepped over a line.”117 Why would it be
important for Judge Lenehan to keep in mind Jane’s supposedly inappropriate
dancing earlier in the evening with another man, as he assessed Constable
Thibault’s evidence that she found the Complainant unconscious, naked
from the breasts down, her legs spread apart with the accused, pants
undone, in between them? Was Jane’s suggestive dancing important to Judge
Lenehan’s assessment of the evidence that Jane’s DNA was found around the
accused’s mouth, or that the accused tried to hide her pants, underwear, and
shoes when he became aware of the police officer’s presence? The answer,
of course, is that the Complainant’s allegedly inappropriate dancing earlier
that evening is not relevant to any of this evidence.118 The fact that Jane may
have danced suggestively with her best friend’s boyfriend at the bar does
not increase the logical probability that she stripped her clothes off, kissed
or licked the face of a taxi driver she had met only minutes before, and then
propped her legs up in the straddle position.119 As I have already argued,
it is reasonable to assume that the probative value of Jane’s supposedly
“inappropriate” dancing was reliant on the stereotype of the unchaste party
girl.
While Craggs asserted in his closing that this case was not about consent,
this is clearly not true based on the nature of the evidence introduced at trial,
which was almost entirely unchallenged by him. Nor does this assertion
appear to reflect his theory of the case: that the Complainant removed her
116

Defence Closing, supra note 69 at 13h:50m:32s.
Ibid.
118 Seaboyer, supra note 66 at 682, L’Heureux-Dubé J (dissenting in part, but not on
this issue): “Once the mythical bases of relevancy determinations in this area of the law is
revealed … [t]he irrelevance of most evidence of prior sexual history is clear”.
119 Ibid at 604, McLachlin J (as she then was) (for the majority).
117
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own clothes, threw them at Al-Rawi, perhaps kissed or licked his face, and
placed herself in the physical position she was in when the police found
her.120 To suggest that a woman stripped off her pants and underwear,
perhaps kissed or licked the accused, and spread her legs straddling the
front seats of a car, is to suggest that this woman was consenting.121
Section 276 serves two primary objectives. Arguably, the three legal
professionals responsible for the conduct of the trial in Al-Rawi failed to
ensure that either of these objectives were met. First, section 276 aims
to protect sexual assault complainants from the humiliation that can
occur when they are required to answer irrelevant questions, premised
on stereotypical assumptions, about their prior sexual activities. The
Complainant in this case did not receive this protection. Second, section
276 excludes most prior sexual activity evidence because of the likelihood
that it will mislead the trier(s) of fact—that the stereotypes that underpin
beliefs about the relevance of this type of evidence will distort the supposed
truth-seeking function of the trial.122 Judge Lenehan’s reasoning in AlRawi appears to affirm this concern. For example, in his decision to acquit,
Judge Lenehan speculated that the Complainant had flirted with Al-Rawi:
“He knew going along with any flirtation on her part involved him taking
advantage of a vulnerable person.”123 This was conjecture. To borrow from
Judge Lenehan’s language in the decision—and unlike his characterization
of the evidentiary record with respect to the issue of non-consent—there
actually was “absolutely no evidence”124 that the Complainant flirted with
Al-Rawi. Did Judge Lenehan speculate that she flirted with the accused
because he accepted, based on evidence that she had danced suggestively
120 Recall that in his cross-examination of the Complainant, defence counsel asked
her: “Do you remember, um, taking your pants off in the back of the taxi and throwing them
up front?”, “Do you remember throwing your shoes up front into the front seat of the taxi?”,
“Do you remember suggesting to the taxi driver that you may be interested in having sex with
him?” (Testimony of Complainant, supra note 6 at 15h:21m:12s).
121 It is true that during the proceeding defence counsel: (i) raised the possibility that
there was no sexual touching once during his objection to the toxicologist’s testimony; (ii)
speculated that the DNA on Al-Rawi’s face may have come from her urine; (iii) implied to
the Complainant that she told Al-Rawi the wrong directions or forgot where she was going
(which she did not accept as reasonable, on the basis that she always remembers her address
but stated she could not remember); and (iv) speculated that perhaps the Complainant exited
the taxi at some point to urinate (presumably to offer an alternative explanation for her lack of
clothing, although he did not actually assert this conclusion). None of this changed the nature
of his main argument: based on the circumstantial evidence available, the most reasonable
inference was that the Complainant was not only a consenting party to the removal of her
clothing and the highly-sexualized positioning of her partially naked body, but was in fact the
initiator.
122 Seaboyer, supra note 66 at 605.
123 Oral Decision, supra note 3 at 13h:55m:07s.
124 Ibid at 13h:55m:28s.
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with her best friend’s boyfriend, that that was just the sort of thing “Drunk
Jane”125 would do? Did he ignore the significant circumstantial evidence of
lack of consent, and accept as reasonable the proposition that this distraught
young woman may have consented to the removal of her urine-soaked
clothes by a complete stranger, within minutes of meeting him, because he
accepted that she had been flirtatious with other men earlier that night? It is
difficult not to question whether Judge Lenehan’s speculation, implausible
conclusions and legally incorrect reasoning were informed by the stereotype
that “unchaste” women, or “promiscuous party girls”, will consent to sex
with anyone, anywhere.
4. Conclusion
What occurred in this legal proceeding is unacceptable. Judge Lenehan’s
failure warranted much of the public critique and outrage it received. His
mistakes and deficiencies in this case were serious. Although the principle
of judicial independence demands that we not lose sight of the difference
between judicial error and misconduct, the public is right to expect and
demand much better of those individuals granted the enormous power
and responsibility to preside over sexual assault trials. As recently noted
by the Canadian Judicial Council: “Canadians expect their judges to
know the law but also to possess empathy and to recognize and question
any past personal attitudes and sympathies that might prevent them from
acting fairly.”126 While Judge Lenehan’s decision is filled with errors and it
should be overturned, his conduct of the case in Al-Rawi does not appear to
amount to judicial misconduct. What it does amount to, however, is further
evidence of the need for both a legal rule requiring judges in sexual assault
trials to provide written decisions, and much more rigorous sexual assault
training for judges.127
Consider first the suggestion that judges be required to provide written
reasons in sexual assault cases. Written decisions provide a degree of
transparency and public accountability not available with oral decisions.
This case, like other recent sexual assault cases,128 came to light because a
journalist happened to be in the courtroom and decided to report on the
125

Supra note 71.
Canadian Judicial Council, In the Matter of S 63 of the Judges Act, RS c J-1:
Canadian Judicial Council Inquiry into the Conduct of the Honourable Robin Camp: Report to
the Minister of Justice (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 8 March 2017) at para 2.
127 Leader of the Official Opposition, Rona Ambrose, introduced a private member’s
bill, Bill C-337, An Act to amend the Judges Act and the Criminal Code, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl,
2015 (second reading & referral to committee 9 March 2017), which would require both
written reasons in sexual assault cases and sexual assault training for judges.
128 See e.g. Mike McIntyre, “Rape victim ‘inviting,’ so no jail”, Winnipeg Free Press (24
February 2011), online: <www.winnipegfreepress.com>. See also Sean Fine, “Third Alberta
126
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decision.129 Indeed, absent the Crown’s decision to appeal or a journalist’s
decision to report, sexual assault cases involving oral decisions provide
no opportunity for scrutiny by researchers, legislators, or the public. The
provision of written reasons promotes the open court principle. Given the
ongoing difficulties with the criminal justice system’s response to sexualized
violence, there are compelling reasons to ensure that, in the sexual assault
context, judicial reasoning is as accessible and assessable as possible.
Requiring written decisions also has the potential to ensure more
careful, thorough, and well-reasoned judgments in what is a sensitive
and difficult area of law—an area of law in which the legal profession
and the judiciary have struggled to maintain public confidence in the
administration of justice. While Judge Lenehan’s statement that “clearly a
drunk can consent” was not legally incorrect, it was carelessly included in
an oral judgement that, at a minimum, clearly had the potential to be highly
controversial. It is possible that, in a written decision, he would have taken
more care in wording his legal conclusion that it is only at a certain level of
intoxication that a complainant will be found to lack capacity to consent.
From the perspective of those interested in encouraging the public to engage
in cautious and attentive ascertainment of consent when contemplating
sex with an intoxicated person, a more carefully crafted decision by Judge
Lenehan would have avoided the unhelpful phenomenon of headline after
headline that read: “Clearly a drunk can consent.”130
Perhaps the exercise of composing written reasons would have prevented
Judge Lenehan from making the legal errors that pervaded his oral decision.
His oral decision in Al-Rawi stands in stark contrast to written decisions
involving similar facts and legal issues, like that of Justice Greene in Tariq.131
In assessing whether an intoxicated complainant with severe memory loss
lacked capacity to consent, Justice Greene carefully reviewed the relevant
case law and legislative framework. Judge Lenehan did not cite or review a
single legal precedent in Al-Rawi.
Judge Faces Review Over Handling of Sex-Assault Case”, The Globe and Mail (14 September
2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com> [Sean Fine].
129 Haley Ryan, “‘Clearly a drunk can consent’ Halifax Judge says in acquitting taxi
driver charged with sexual assault”, Metro (1 March 2017), online: <www.metronews.ca>.
130 See e.g. Ashley Csanady, “‘Clearly, a drunk can consent’: N.S. judge acquits taxi
driver of sexually assaulting woman in back seat”, National Post (2 March 2017), online:
<www.nationalpost.com>; Alison Auld & Michael Macdonald, “‘Clearly, a drunk can
consent’; Cabbie’s acquittal renews debate on alcohol, consent rulings”, Toronto Sun (3 March
2017), online: <www.torontosun.com>; Ryan, ibid; “Transcript: Read the full decision from
the judge who said ‘clearly a drunk can consent’, CBC News (3 March 2017), online: <www.
cbc.ca/news>.
131 Supra note 35 at paras 77–94.
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As noted, the judicial failure in Al-Rawi also raises the issue of proper
training for judges who preside over sexual assault trials. While a rigorous
examination of sexual assault training for judges—what it should entail, how
it should be delivered, and by whom—is beyond the scope of this article,
it bears mentioning that the potential harms that occur in sexual assault
trials when judges lack proper training, legal knowledge, and the ability to
identify and resist rape mythology are significant. The judicial failure in AlRawi can be added to the list of recent sexual assault cases across Canada
that illustrate the need to better educate trial judges who adjudicate sexual
assault proceedings.132
To be clear, responsibility for what occurred in this case is likely not
Judge Lenehan’s alone to bear. In assessing the disturbing outcome in AlRawi, consideration should also be given to the role that legal counsel may
have played in allowing this failure of the legal system to occur. Arguably,
evidence of the Complainant flirting or dancing “inappropriately” with
other men earlier that night, and propensity-based assertions about “Drunk
Jane”,133 should not have been introduced, let alone repeated and left with
the trial judge unchallenged.
Legal commentators, particularly members of the criminal defence bar,
often defend criticisms of the criminal justice system’s response to sexualized
violence by pointing to the many legal protections for complainants available
under Canadian law.134 First among those to which they are likely to point
are the rape shield provisions.135 To be effective, these legal protections
rely on each of the legal professionals charged with complying with and
upholding them.
Judge Lenehan’s decision in Al-Rawi has been appealed by the Crown.
Assuming that Judge Lenehan is overturned, a second trial is ordered, and
the Complainant is willing to go through the ordeal of testifying again, the
legal profession and the judiciary in Nova Scotia will have an opportunity
to regain some of the public’s understandably diminished faith in our legal
system’s ability to respond justly to allegations of sexual assault.

132 See e.g. R v Wagar, 2015 ABCA 327, [2015] AJ No 1152 (QL); R v Rhodes,
Sentencing Transcript (18 February 2011) (MBQB). See also Sean Fine, supra note 128.
133 Supra note 71.
134 See e.g. Anne London-Weinstein, “London-Weinstein: Judges don’t need more
coaching on sex assault”, Ottawa Citizen (21 March 2017), online <www.ottawacitizen.com>.
135 Ibid.

